Evaluating Treatment Effect and Causal Effect of Fiscal Rules on Procyclicality: New assessments on old debate: rules vs. discretion by Mandon, Pierre
Evaluating Treatment Effect and Causal Effect of Fiscal
Rules on Procyclicality
Pierre Mandon
To cite this version:
Pierre Mandon. Evaluating Treatment Effect and Causal Effect of Fiscal Rules on Procyclical-
ity: New assessments on old debate: rules vs. discretion. 2014. <hal-01015439>
HAL Id: hal-01015439
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01015439
Submitted on 26 Jun 2014
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
1 
 
Evaluating Treatment Effect and Causal Effect of Fiscal Rules on Procyclicality 
New assessments on old debate: rules vs. discretion  
 Pierre Mandon♠  (2014) 
 
Abstract 
This article is the first to renews the old debate of "rules versus. discretion" by introducing 
propensity score matching methods in macro analysis, such as Tapsoba (2012), and by using 
instrumental methods, to consider the national stability culture. By taking into account, at the 
same time, the self-selection problem and the omitted unobserved factor bias, in a sample of 
126 countries of all level of development over the period 1985-2010, we provide strong 
evidence about the positive causal effect of fiscal rules adoption on the reduction of  fiscal 
policy procyclicality. We find an asymmetrical impact, since fiscal rules adoption contributed 
to upgrade budget balance in periods of expansion, while it doesn't increase budget deficit in 
periods of recession. Furthermore, we show that the budget balance rules and the debt rules 
are more effective to dampen procyclicality than expenditure rules. We also provide evidence 
that the coverage of fiscal rules is not a critical issue to strength against procyclicality. 
Empirical results also displays the positive impact of the adoption of flexible rules, but also 
the adoption of  fiscal rules combined to improve policy responsiveness.  Finally, we find that 
FRs are effective when taking into account the national stability culture.  This positive impact 
of fiscal rules adoption on fiscal policy cyclicality comes from an  improvement of fiscal 
policy disciplinary, by ensuring a sustainable path of deficit and debt, or by smoothing 
business cycles. 
Keywords: Fiscal Rules; Fiscal Rules Spread; Fiscal Policy Responsiveness; Procyclicality; 
Treatment Effect; Propensity Scores Matching. 
JEL Codes: H11; E32; E6. 
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1. Introduction 
As economic theory depicted, countries must have to  pursue countercyclical or acyclical  
fiscal policy.1 Meanwhile, some economies, and notably developing countries, have followed 
procyclical fiscal policy in the last decades, since they raised spending or tax cuts during 
expansion, and cuts spending or raised taxes during recession (Frankel et al., 2013; Végh and 
Vuletin, 2012). This phenomenon can be explain by imperfect access to international credit 
markets for emerging economies (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2004; Gavin and Perotti, 
1997; Gavin et al., 1996; Riascos and Végh, 2003), or due to the presence of political 
distortions in the considered country (Alesina et al., 2008; Talvi and Végh, 2005; Tornell and 
Lane, 1999; Velasco, 1997). Alternatively, the recent financial and economical crisis 
highlighted the fact that high debt context may enhance procyclical behavior since it severely 
reduce the fiscal space for political authorities when they conduct public policies (Blanchard 
et al., 2013; Combes et al., 2014; Égert, 2012).  
Empirical literature point out that structural improvements in institutional framework seems to 
be the key to strength against procyclical fiscal policy (Frankel et al., 2012).  Among this 
institutions, budget institutions may have a role, since they might reduce bias of unrestricted 
fiscal policy such as the inability of governments to reach fiscal balances (Alesina and Perotti, 
1994). The two kinds of budget institutions in place are budget processes and numerical fiscal 
rules.2 In this paper we focus on fiscal rules, due to data availability at the country level on the 
latter. Fiscal rules (FRs, hereafter) are long-lasting constraints on fiscal policy which are 
expressed as synthetic indicators of fiscal performance (Kopits and Symansky, 1988). In 
1985, 4 countries are fiscal rulers (FRers, hereafter), while twenty five years later 76 countries 
have adopted FRs (see Graphic 1).3    
The controversy in academic literature about the merits of FRs is known as the debate of 
"rules versus. discretion". For the critics, FRs (and more generally explicit constraints) 
lowering the responsiveness of fiscal policy to output fluctuations, while for the proponents of 
FRs, explicit constraints will prevents governments from running unsustainable path of fiscal 
policy and smooth business cycles by reducing macroeconomic volatility. 
 
                                                           
1
 See Keynes (1937), Friedman (1957) and Barro (1989) for a thorough discussion on optimal fiscal policy. 
2
 For a literature review on budget institutions, see Alesina and Perotti (1999). 
3
 The majority of FRers countries adopted budget balance rules, debt rules, or a combination thereof.   
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Graphic 1. 
 
On the one hand, Alt and Lowry (1994), Roubini and Sachs (1989) and Poterba (1994) found 
that explicit constraints on fiscal policy result in slower adjustments to unexpected shocks, 
while Lane (2003) and  Levinson (1998) conclude that governments who are subject to 
stronger constraints leads to more procyclical fiscal policy.4  
On the other hand, Alesina and Bayoumi (1996), Bohn and Inman (1996),  Brzozowoski and 
Siwinska-Gorzelak (2010),  Fatás and Mihov (2006), deHaan et al. (1999),  Hallerberg and 
Von Hagen (1999), Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002), and Tapsoba (2012) provide some 
evidence about the disciplinary effect of constraints on fiscal policy, while Fatás and Mihov 
(2006) found that fiscal constraints in US context smooth business cycles. 
The objective of this article is to demonstrate that FRs are an effective tool to struggle fiscal 
procyclicality by improving fiscal policy responsiveness, when taking into account the self-
selection problem, as in Tapsoba (2012), but also the omitted unobserved factor bias of 
stability culture at national level. As describe in Graphic 1.a (see Appendix a) it appears that 
FRers countries improve their fiscal policy responsiveness (or improve their fiscal 
countercyclicality) by 0.237 percentage points, between the pre-FR period and the post-FR 
                                                           
4
 As reported by Levinson (1998), a petition signed by 1100 economists in the New-York Times (2/3/1997) states: "To keep 
the budget balanced (in US states) would aggravate recessions". 
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period, while non-FRers countries improve their fiscal policy responsiveness by 0.043 
percentage points only, between the pre-FR period and the post-FR period.5 This correlation 
displays a net improvement of  fiscal responsiveness of 0.194 percentage points, due to FR 
implementation. Unfortunately, we can't conclude of a causal impact of FRs on fiscal policy 
responsiveness due to the self-selection problem and the omitted unobserved factor bias 
detailed hereafter. In the paper closest to ours, Combes et al. (2014)  found that FRs dampen 
the impact of public debt burden on the implementation of countercyclical fiscal policy in 
OECD countries and emerging economies.  
Employing propensity score matching methods and instrumental methods within a sample of 
126 countries over the period 1985-2010, we find evidence that FR adoption (considered as a 
treatment during the rest of the article) strongly reduce procyclical behavior of fiscal policy. 
In other words, in time of economic booms, FR adoption ensure improvements in 
governments budget balances. Moreover, our results indicate that FR adoption does not foster 
countercyclical fiscal policy in time of economic bust (i.e. FR adoption does not exacerbate 
budget deficits during recessions).  As illustrated by Graphic 2.a and Graphic 3.a (see 
Appendix a), upswings in budget balances and primary budget balances are observed for three 
chosen countries, of all levels of development, which adopted national FRs (Canada, Costa-
Rica and Namibia), and two monetary unions, which adopted supranational FRs  (Economic 
Community of African Central States and European Union), between the pre-FR period and 
the post-FR period.6 This paper also find that FRs have different impact on fiscal policy 
responsiveness, depending on their targets, since sustainability rules and flexible rules exert a 
strong and significant impact on fiscal policy responsiveness upgrading, while FRs targeting 
government expenditures doesn't exert a significant impact. Furthermore, the coverage of FRs 
(i.e. national rules or supranational rules) is not a critical issue to strength against 
procyclicality of fiscal policy. Finally, we find that FRs are effective even in a context of 
historical weakness of stability culture, which is actually the case in a significant number of 
emerging countries and low income economies. 
                                                           
5
 Regarding non-FRers, we define the cut-off as the mid-year of the period running from the first adoption of FR (Japan 
adopted  FR in 1947, but our sample begin in 1985, this latter becomes therefore the starting date of FR for Japan)  and the 
ending date in our sample (2010), that is 1998. 
6
 We choose three countries of all levels of development which adopting national FRs around 1998, the mid-year of the 
period 1985-2010 (Canada: 1998 ; Costa-Rica: 2001 ; Namibia: 2001). We can't analyze the evolution of fiscal discipline for 
the Western African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), since we don't have any observation for primary budget 
balance over GDP before FRs adoption. Concerning figures for European Union, we deal with the twelve signatory countries 
of the Maastricht treaty in 1992.   
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To our own known, this paper is the very first to assess the impact of FRs on fiscal policy 
responsiveness on a wide sample of countries, when taking into account, at the same time, the 
self-selection problem and the omitted factor bias of stability culture. We provide significant 
evidence of the effectiveness of FR adoption to struggle fiscal policy procyclicality. Our 
findings are robust (i) when using alternative measures of fiscal policy responsiveness, (ii) 
when considering alternative adoption date, and (iii) when estimating alternative propensity 
score.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 consider the dataset and describes the 
econometric methodology. Section 3 displays empirical results, while section 4 briefly 
concludes and draws some policy recommendations. 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1. Data 
Our data consists of 126 countries, over the period 1985-2010, due to information availability 
on FRs. On this sample 67 countries are FRers. Among this countries, 25 are advanced 
economies,  24 are emerging economies, and 18 are low-income countries.7  The 59 non-
FRers countries are used as control group. All treated countries and control countries are 
listed in Table 1.b (see Appendix b). The panel is unbalanced because of missing 
observations. FRs starting dates are taken from the revised version of the Fiscal Rule Dataset 
(Budina et al., 2012) published by the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department, which include 
information about national and supranational fiscal rules across the Fund membership. In the 
econometric analysis, FR is a binary variable equaling one, if in a given country, in a given 
year a FR is implemented for at least five years, over the period 1985-2010.8 We also consider 
the nature of FR in place, in terms of targeting, flexibility, coverage, and combination. All 
details concerning the nature of FRs and their adopting dates are given in Table 2.b (see 
Appendix b).   
Following Aghion and Marinescu (2008), we estimate the cyclicality of fiscal policy as: 
 =  + 	
 + ,         (1) 
where → 0, 

()
 and () =  exp"(−
($)
 ). 
                                                           
7
 Income categories refers to Budina et al. (2012) classification. 
8
 Our results are robust when we take into account countries which adopt FR for less than five years. 
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 is the measure of fiscal policy, captured by the budget balance over GDP, 	
 is the 
output gap and  is the error term. The budget balance ratio is used for benchmark results 
instead of the primary budget balance ratio, since we loss about 33% of total observations 
with the latter indicator.9 The output gap is calculated as the difference between the logarithm 
of real GDP and the logarithm of a Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend of real GDP (with 100 as 
smoothing parameter).10 The coefficient of interest,  show that fiscal policy is 
coutercyclical (procyclical) if  > 0"(< 0), while acyclical otherwise. Using the Local 
Gaussian Weighted Ordinary Least Squares (LGWOLS), we compute the  coefficients 
using all available observations for each country i at each date t, with observations weighted 
by a Gaussian centered at the considered date t (with 5 as value for  ', as used by Aghion and 
Marinescu, 2008). 
2.2. Methodology 
We consider FRs adoption as a treatment just as in Tapsoba (2012), inspired by 
microeconometrics impact evaluation. For us, FRers countries are the treated group, while 
non-FRers countries are the control group. So, we calculate the Average Treatment effect of 
the Treated (ATT, hereafter), which is the average effect of being FRer on fiscal policy 
responsiveness: 
()) = *+( − ,)|. = 10 = *+|. = 10 − *+,|. = 10,    (2) 
where . is the Fiscal Rule dummy in country i.  is the  fiscal policy cyclicality (and 
more generally the value of outcome variable) when country i has adopted the FR and , if 
not. In other words, ,|. = 1 is the fiscal policy cyclicality that would have been observed 
if a FRer country had not adopted fiscal rule policy, while |. = 1 is the actual fiscal 
policy cyclicality which is observed on the same country. This equation would imply  that the 
average fiscal policy cyclicality that a FRer country would have if it had not adopted FR is the 
best counterfactual. However, such a counterfactual is not observable, due to the identification 
problem. 
We just can't compare the sample mean fiscal policy responsiveness between the treated 
group and the control group because FR adoption is probably non-random, as FR is certainly 
correlated with observable variables that affects fiscal policy cyclicality, leading to the self-
                                                           
9
 Note that our main findings remains qualitatively unchanged when we use the primary budget balance ratio.  
10
 Note that our main findings remains qualitatively unchanged when we use 6.25 as smoothing parameter, as recommended 
by Ravn and Uhlig (2002). 
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selection problem, which can biased estimates of the ATT. So, we use alternative propensity 
score matching (PSM, hereafter)  methods  to deal with self-selection bias. With PSM we 
retain as a control group all countries similar to FRers in terms of observed characteristics 
which affects simultaneously FR adoption and fiscal policy cyclicality. Consequently, the 
difference between cyclicality in FRers countries (1234.,) and cyclicality between matched 
counterfactual (1234.) is attributable to the treatment. To use PSM we need to assume 
conditional independence, i.e. 1234., , 1234. ⊥ .|7, which requires for, conditional on 
observables 7, the outcomes 1234., and 1234. to be independent of the treatment. Under this 
assumption, Equation above can be rewritten as: 
()) = *+|. = 1, 70 − *+,|. = 0, 70,        (3) 
where *+,|. = 0, 70"is now observable. Yet, as the number of covariates (7) increases, 
such a matching  would be difficult to implement in practice. To skirt the high dimension 
problem, we use propensity score instead of 7, following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 
Propensity score is the probability of adopting FR, conditionally to 7: 
8(7) = *+.|70 = 9(. = 1|7).        (4) 
Under the common support assumption (i.e. 8(7) < 1), requiring the existence of some 
comparable control units for each treated unit, we estimate ATT as:11  
()) = *+:|. = 1, 8("7)0 − *+:,|. = 0, 8(7)0.      (5) 
Following Tapsoba (2012), we use four traditional PSM methods. First, the nearest-neighbor 
matching with replacement matches each treated unit to the n control units having the closest 
propensity score (we consider n=1, n=2 and n=3). The second method is radius matching, 
which matches a treated unit to the control units with estimated propensity scores falling 
within a radius (or "caliper") r  (we consider a wide radius r=0.10, a medium radius r=0.05 
and a small radius r=0.03). The third method is the regression-adjusted local linear matching 
of Heckman et al. (1998), which consists of matching covariates-adjusted outcome for the 
treated group with the corresponding covariates-adjusted outcomes for the control group, 
using local linear regression weights. Finally, kernel matching method matches a treated unit 
to all control units weighted proportionally by their closeness in terms to propensity scores, to 
the treated unit. As the matching method estimator has no analytical variance, we compute 
                                                           
11
 We systematically employ the common support option, which exclude all treated countries whose propensity score is 
higher than the maximum, or lesser than the minimum propensity score of the untreated countries.  
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standard errors by bootstrapping (i.e. by re-sampling observations of the control group), 
following Dehejia and Wahba (2002).  
3. Results 
3.1. Estimating the propensity scores 
We estimate the propensity scores using a probit model with FRs binary variable as the 
dependant variable.12 Our baseline selection equation includes past discretionary fiscal policy, 
the logarithm of real GDP per capita, the logarithm of government expenditure ratio, the 
logarithm of natural rents ratio, and some political variables, such as democracy degree,  
federal states forms, majoritarian electoral rules, presidential forms of governments and  
member of currency union status.   
FRs are expected to be more likely approved in a rugged fiscal context because they're based 
on the principle of public credibility concerning government announcement on fiscal policy 
objectives (Budina et al., 2012; Calderón and Schmidt-Hebel, 2008; IMF, 2009). So we 
anticipate a negative correlation between the likelihood of FRs adoption and lagged 
discretionary fiscal policy.13 FRs are also more likely to be adopt in countries with favorable 
macroeconomic situation, (Budina et al., 2012; IMF, 2009) due to the economical and 
political implementation costs of such a reform. Accordingly, we expect a positive correlation 
between the probability of adopting FRs and the logarithm of real GDP per capita. Countries 
with higher state size are more prone to adopt  FRs to dampen the "common-pool" problem, 
since a lot of public spending is targeted to specific groups of voters, while it is financed by 
all voters (Alesina and Perotti, 1998 ; Von Hagen, 2005). As a result, we expect a positive 
correlation between the probability of FRs adoption and government expenditure ratio. Rich-
endowed countries in natural resources are more likely to choose FRs, due to the so-called 
"natural-resource curse", which  may directly rise growth  at the price of deeper volatility 
(Poelhekeand and Van der Ploeg, 2007). Again, the expected sign on the coefficient of natural 
rents ratio is positive. 
 Concerning political factors, we assume a positive connection between the probability of 
adopting FRs and  the democracy degree. Recall that higher democracy degree imply more 
clearly defined constraints on executive, but also broader inclusion of citizens in the political 
                                                           
12
 All results remains unchanged when we use a logit model, confirming the adequacy of the assumption about normality of 
the probit model. 
13
 In line with Fatás and Mihov (2003; 2006), discretionary fiscal policy refers to any modification in fiscal policy which is 
not justify by economic conditions. The measurement is detailed in Appendix d. 
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decision making process (Acemoglu et al., 2003 ; Gerring et al., 2005; Lijphart, 2012).14  
Naturally it imply a reinforcement in the commitment of political leaders to "tying their 
hands" with FRs, to dampen  the consequences of  polarized social preferences (Talvi and 
Végh, 2005; Woo, 2009), but also conflicts of interest between political parties (Alesina and 
Tabellini, 1990),  the agency problem between voters and politicians (Alesina et al., 2008; 
Von Hagen, 2005) ; and the previously analyzed "common-pool" problem  (Alesina and 
Perotti, 1995; Von Hagen, 2005).  
The expected sign on  federal states forms is ambiguous a priori. On the one hand, federalism  
imply strong vertical separation of power (Gerring et al., 2005) and so a strong willingness for 
local jurisdiction to minimize the economical (and political) trespassing of the federal state 
(Huber et al., 1993; Swank, 2002).  Under this perspective,  FRs can be view as an effective 
tool to steers the economical weight of the federal state. On the other hand, federal states 
forms may suffers from a coordination problem to take decisions at national level (Gerring et 
al., 2007).  
The expected sign on majoritarian electoral system is also ambiguous a priori. Indeed, 
majoritarian electoral rules implied lower probability of coalition government formation 
(Austen-Smith and Banks, 2000).15 So, majoritarian rules not acting in favor of a commitment 
between political parties to "tying their hands" with FRs, except for FRs targeting debt (or 
debt rules) since political leaders have some interest to avoid the consequences of strategic 
utilization of debt by the opposition (Alesina and Tabellini, 1990). 
 Presidential forms of governments are expected  to have a positive impact on FRs adoption. 
In fact presidential regimes imply a strong horizontal separation of power (Lijphart, 2012; 
Gerring et al., 2005) and so a strong willingness for each political parties to "tying their 
hands" with FRs, since it meets the need to predict behavior of executive leader (Henisz, 
2000; 2002), whose position is secure from the confidence vote by the opposition.  
Finally, we anticipate a positive correlation between the member of currency union status and 
FRs adoption. Indeed, in monetary unions FRs are approved at a supranational level, in order 
to prevent state to over-borrowing and demanding a bailout to central bank (Eichengreen and 
Von Hagen, 1996), but also to  overturning Mundell's trade-off between transaction costs and 
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 We take into account the instability of political regimes through democracy degree since it include revolutions and coups 
d'État. 
15
 We take into account government fragmentation through electoral system, since majoritarian electoral rules tend to favor 
concentration of power in a two-party system (see Duverger's law).  
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stabilization policy (Cooper and Kempf, 2004). Otherwise the presence of supranational rules 
may encourage the adoption of national rules (Debrun et al., 2008 ; IMF, 2009).16 
Table 1.c (see Appendix c)  exhibit the probit estimates of propensity scores. Almost all 
coefficient  are significant with the expected signs. Lagged discretionary fiscal policy is 
negatively correlated with FRs adoption, while the real GDP per capita, natural resource 
endowment, democracy degree and member of currency union status are always positively 
and significantly associated with the probability of adopting FRs.17  
Otherwise, presidential forms of governments are positively link to FRs adoption and 
especially expenditure rules, while majoritarian electoral system and state size are positively 
correlated with debt rules adoption (and expenditure rules adoption regarding  state size), but 
negatively (or unsignificantly) associated with other forms of FRs adoption. Finally federal 
state forms are negatively (or unsignificantly) associated with any forms of FRs adoption, 
except for FRs associated with well-defined escape clause. 
3.2. Results from matching on propensity scores 
In accordance with first assessments, results from PSM methods displays the positive and 
causal impact of FRs adoption on fiscal policy responsiveness. So, when we take into account 
self-selection problem, FRs remains effective to struggle fiscal procyclicality through 
improvements in fiscal policy responsiveness by 0.134 percentage points and 0.156 
percentage points. Our findings are in accordance with Combes et al. (2014). To verify the 
adequacy of  the control group, we check the standardized bias on observables after matching 
(see Table 1, hereafter). It systematically under 5%, as recommended by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1985). 
Our results are extremely robust to several sensitivity checks. Firstly, we replace the budget 
balance ratio over GDP by the primary budget balance ratio over GDP as a measure of fiscal 
policy, when calculating the fiscal policy cyclicality. Secondly, we use a smoothing parameter 
equaling 6.25 for Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend of real GDP, when calculating the fiscal 
policy cyclicality. Thirdly, we consider the last year of major addition or subsequent change 
for the FRs as alternative starting date for FRs adoption, with information obtained from the 
Fiscal Rule Dataset (Budina et al., 2012). Finally, we estimated propensity scores, by 
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 Budina et al. (2012) displays that supranational rules are not yet completed by national rules for the majority of currency 
union members. 
17
 Note that member of currency union status is positively associated with supranational FRs adoption, but negatively 
associated with national FRs adoption. 
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replacing  the lagged value of discretionary fiscal policy by the lagged value of 
macroeconomic volatility, calculated as the standard deviation of the growth rate of real GDP. 
Furthermore, we find that FR adoption exert an impact on fiscal policy responsiveness, which 
is conditional to economic health. On the one hand, during periods of expansion, we find that 
FR adoption have a positive and significant impact on fiscal policy responsiveness. It means 
that FR adoption ensure improvements in governments budget balances during time of 
economic boom. On the other hand, during periods of recession, we show that FR adoption 
have a negative, but insignificant, impact on fiscal policy responsiveness. It means that the 
presence of FR in the country does not exacerbate budget deficits during time of economic 
bust. 
Finally, when calculating the ATT impact of FRs adoption, we distinguish FRs according to 
their different classification. Regarding basic rules, we take into account FRs by their 
targeting, namely the budget balance rules, the debt rules and the expenditure rules.18 
Regarding flexible rules, we take into account the cyclically-adjusted balance rules, the 
golden rules (i.e. a rule which exclude public investments or other priority items from ceiling) 
and rules allowing escape clause in their implementation. Regarding the coverage of FRs, we 
distinguish FRs adopted at a national level, from FRs adopted at a supranational level, in 
currency unions.  Regarding the combination of rules, we take into account the combination 
of the  budget balance rules with debt rules, since it's the most common combination of FRs 
over the period 1985-2010. We find that almost all kind of FRs improve significantly fiscal 
policy responsiveness, except expenditure rules, which have a negative or unsignificant 
impact on fiscal policy responsiveness. Which imply the importance of the targeting when 
countries adopting FRs to strength against procyclicality.  
3.2.1. Benchmark results 
In Table 1 (hereafter) , the 1st line reports the estimated ATT of FRs adoption on fiscal policy 
responsiveness. The estimated ATT is systematically positive and significant. The amplitude 
of the estimated ATT ranges from 0.134 (0.03-radius matching)  to 0.156 (1-nearest-neighbor 
matching), suggesting that on average, FRs adoption upgrade fiscal policy responsiveness  by 
0.134 percentage points and 0.156 percentage points, respectively. So, contrary to Lane 
(2003) and Levinson (1998) we provide some evidence that stronger constraints on fiscal 
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 We don't take into account the revenue rule since only seven countries have adopted such a rule over 1985-2010, namely 
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, France, Kenya and Netherlands. 
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policy leads to less procyclical fiscal policy. This impact could be due to the disciplinary 
impact of FRs on fiscal policy, or due to the fact that FRs smooth business cycles. 
Note that the estimated impact of FRs adoption obtained from PSM is not so far to the 
correlation of 0.194  percentage points improvements for fiscal policy responsiveness, 
obtained from the Graphic 1.a ( see Appendix a). Our findings are extremely robust to the 
different matching methods, in terms of statistical significance and magnitude of coefficients. 
The average and median bias on observables after matching are always under the threshold of 
5% defined by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). 
The 2nd section of Table 1 displays the estimated ATT for the sensitivity checks. Our main 
findings  are robust  in terms of magnitude, to several modifications in the calculation of fiscal 
policy cyclicality (see line [a] and line [b]). Our results are also robust in terms of magnitude 
and statistical significance when we consider alternative (or conservative) adopting date for 
FRs (see line [c]). Finally, the results are also robust in terms of magnitude and statistical 
significance, when we estimated propensity scores by replacing our measure of discretionary 
fiscal policy with macroeconomic volatility. 
3.2.2. Economic cycle 
The 3rd section of Table 1 displays the estimated ATT of FRs adoption on fiscal policy 
responsiveness, depending on the position in the business cycle. During time of economic 
boom (see line [a]), FRs adoption enhances fiscal policy responsiveness among 0.271 
percentage points (0.10-radius matching) and 0.358 percentage points (2 and 3-nearest-
neighbor matching). In other words, FRs adoption is effective to reinforce fiscal consolidation 
in periods of expansion. The line [b] displays the estimated ATT during time of economic 
bust. Irrespective of the matching method, the estimated ATT is negative and statistically 
unsignificant. In other words, FRs adoption exert an asymmetrical impact on fiscal policy 
procyclicality, since it increase budget balance during periods of expansion, while it doesn't 
exacerbate budget deficits during periods of recession. To our own know, these findings are 
totally new and demonstrate that the FRs impact on fiscal performance is conditional to 
economic performance, and show that FRs adoption is not necessarily detrimental for global 
well-being during recessions, since it doesn't have any significant impact on fiscal policy 
responsiveness during these times. 
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3.2.3. The Nature of fiscal rule in place 
The 4th section of Table 1  displays the estimated ATT for basic rules adoption (panel A), for 
flexible rules adoption (panel B), for FRs adoption, regarding their coverage (panel C) and for 
the adoption of combination of FRs (panel D). According to panel A,  budget balance rule 
adoption and debt rule adoption have a positive and significant impact on fiscal policy 
responsiveness (see line [a] and line [b]) while expenditure rule adoption have a negative or 
unsignificant impact on fiscal policy responsiveness (see line [c]). In other words, the 
targeting is a critical issue for governments when they adopt FRs to struggle procyclicality; 
while budget balance rules and deficit rules are closely link to fiscal policy sustainability, 
expenditure rules are indirectly link to fiscal policy sustainability since they're more effective 
to steers the size of governments (Budina et al., 2012). 
 Furthermore, in panel B, the estimated ATT associated to the three forms of flexible rules are 
positive and statistically significant, irrespective to the matching method employed (see lines 
[a], [b] and [c]). In terms of impact magnitude, cyclically-adjusted  balance rules appears to 
be more effective than golden rules or rules implemented with escape clauses to strength 
against procyclicality. Indeed, cyclically-adjusted balances rule adoption improve fiscal 
policy responsiveness by 0.336 percentage points (local linear matching) and 0.422 
percentage points (1-nearest neighbor matching), whereas golden rule adoption enhance fiscal 
policy responsiveness by 0.223 percentage points (3-nearest neighbor matching) and 0.253 
percentage points (2-nearest neigbhor matching) and rule with escape clause adoption upgrade 
fiscal policy responsiveness by  0.194 percentage points (3-nearest neighbor matching) and 
0.218 percentage points (0.10-radius matching). The fact is that cyclically-adjusted balance 
rules are closely link to fiscal policy sustainability and accounts for economic shocks (Budina 
et al., 2012). However,  cyclically-adjusted balance rules are relatively difficult to monitor 
since the correction for cycles is non operational without adequate statistical institution in 
place. 
Moreover, panel C  displays the estimated ATT for FRs adopted at a national level and at 
supranational level and show very interesting results (see line [a] and line [b]). Both national 
and supranational rules adoption enhances fiscal policy responsiveness. In other words, the 
coverage of FRs is not a critical issue to strength against procyclicality. In terms of impact 
magnitude, supranational rules upgrade fiscal responsiveness by 0.197 percentage points 
(0.05-radius matching) and 0.241 percentage points (2-nearest neighbor matching), while 
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national rules enhances fiscal policy responsiveness by 11.8 percentage points (0.10-radius 
matching) and 16.8 percentage points (0.05-radius matching). 
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Table 1.: FRs and Fiscal Policy Responsiveness  
Dependant Variable : Fiscal 
Policy Responsiveness 
            local linear 
regression 
matching 
  
nearest-neighbor matching radius matching kernel matching 
n= 1 n= 2 n= 3 r= 0.03 r= 0.05 r= 0.10   
  
                
[1] 0.156*** 0.151*** 0.146*** 0.134*** 0.141*** 0.155*** 0.152*** 0.140*** 
  [0.051] [0.047] [0.046] [0.040] [0.036] [0.037] [0.040] [0.035] 
Number of treated obs. 730 730 730 730 730 730 730 730 
Number of control obs. 1,474 1,474 1,474 1,474 1,474 1,474 1,474 1,474 
Total observations 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 
Average Bias After 
Matching (%) 4.8 4.8 4.1 3.7 3.5 4.4 4.8 3.6 
Median Bias After Matching 
(%) 2.7 3.3 2.0 1.8 1.7 2.3 2.7 1.8 
[2] Sensitivity Checks 
[a] Alternative fiscal policy 
measurement 
0.140** 0.144** 0.136** 0.123** 0.112** 0.093* 0.131** 0.113** 
[0.062] [0.059] [0.061] [0.054] [0.053] [0.049] [0.058] [0.055] 
[b] Alternative output gap 
measurement 
0.139* 0.111 0.119* 0.101* 0.109* 0.125** 0.127** 0.109* 
[0.082] [0.078] [0.071] [0.061] [0.064] [0.061] [0.063] [0.060] 
[c] Alternative FRs adopting 
date 
0.122*** 0.075* 0.083** 0.097*** 0.101*** 0.123*** 0.106*** 0.101*** 
[0.046] [0.043] [0.042] [0.035] [0.035] [0.034] [0.036] [0.035] 
[d] Alternative propensity 
score estimated 
0.075* 0.085** 0.097*** 0.107*** 0.125*** 0.161*** 0.088** 0.121*** 
[0.043] [0.038] [0.038] [0.033] [0.033] [0.031] [0.036] [0.037] 
[3] Economic Cycle 
[a] Expansion 0.327*** 0.358*** 0.358*** 0.334*** 0.311*** 0.271*** 0.339*** 0.319*** [0.087] [0.081] [0.084] [0.073] [0.071] [0.072] [0.071] [0.072] 
[b] Recession -0.022 -0.023 -0.036 -0.030 -0.035 -0.027 -0.046 -0.034 [0.066] [0.063] [0.066] [0.055] [0.057] [0.058] [0.059] [0.060] 
[4] Nature of Fiscal Rules in place 
Panel A:  Basic Rules 
[a] Budget balance rule 0.178*** 0.191*** 0.217*** 0.189*** 0.181*** 0.183*** 0.213*** 0.182*** [0.055] [0.052] [0.050] [0.044] [0.042] [0.041] [0.047] [0.041] 
[b] Debt rule 0.209*** 0.189*** 0.197*** 0.179*** 0.174*** 0.181*** 0.189*** 0.175*** [0.051] [0.049] [0.049] [0.042] [0.042] [0.042] [0.046] [0.045] 
[c] Expenditure rule -0.076 -0.042 -0.058 -0.087 -0.090* -0.072 -0.110* -0.088* [0.076] [0.070] [0.063] [0.054] [0.054] [0.054] [0.049] [0.052] 
Panel B: Flexible Rules 
[a] Cyclically-adjusted 
balance rule 
0.422*** 0.386*** 0.377*** 0.369*** 0.401*** 0.408*** 0.336*** 0.393*** 
[0.105] [0.108] [0.108] [0.087] [0.090] [0.082] [0.082] [0.080] 
[b] Golden rule 0.235*** 0.253*** 0.223*** 0.237*** 0.240*** 0.250*** 0.250*** 0.246*** [0.063] [0.064] [0.061] [0.048] [0.052] [0.048] [0.048] [0.048] 
[c] Rule with escape clause 0.205*** 0.215*** 0.194*** 0.198*** 0.202*** 0.218*** 0.205*** 0.202*** [0.074] [0.068] [0.066] [0.060] [0.057] [0.058] [0.056] [0.058] 
Panel C: Coverage of Rules 
[a] National rule 0.151*** 0.127*** 0.119** 0.124*** 0.132*** 0.168*** 0.118*** 0.130*** [0.057] [0.056] [0.051] [0.037] [0.036] [0.037] [0.040] [0.039] 
[b] Supranational rule 0.221*** 0.234*** 0.241*** 0.207*** 0.197*** 0.219*** 0.229*** 0.202*** [0.067] [0.060] [0.061] [0.053] [0.053] [0.042] [0.058] [0.053] 
Panel D: Combination of Rules 
[a] Sustainability rules 0.246*** 0.210*** 0.203*** 0.199*** 0.181*** 0.190*** 0.210*** 0.185*** [0.065] [0.060] [0.058] [0.050] [0.044] [0.046] [0.046] [0.048] 
Note: bootstrapped standard errors (via 500 replications) in brackets. 
***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%. 
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These empirical findings are surprising because supranational rules suffers from a problem of 
insufficient enforcement and compliance, with, as consequences, frequently non-sanctioned 
violations by currency union member countries (Prakash and Cabezon, 2008). Having said 
that, supranational rules are systematically targeting budget balance ratio or debt ratio, while 
some national  rules are targeting expenditure (or revenue) ratio. 
Finally, in panel D, the estimated ATT of the simultaneous adoption of budget balance rules 
and debt rules appears to be positive and statistically significant (see line [a]). Indeed the 
adoption of the two sustainability rules improve fiscal responsiveness by 0.181 percentage 
points (0.05-radius matching) and 0.246 percentage points (1-nearest neighbor matching). In 
terms of impact magnitude, we notice that the adoption of a combination of rules slightly 
reinforce the impact of FRs adoption on fiscal policy responsiveness (see line [a] and line [b], 
in panel A). 
We provide strong evidence that FRs adoption  reduce procyclical behavior of fiscal policy, 
by taking into account self-selection problem with PSM methods. Moreover, we found that 
FRs adoption would consolidate budget balance in time of economic boom, while it doesn't 
exacerbate budget deficits during time of economic bust. Furthermore, we find that FRs 
targeting is a critical issue when governments aimed to struggle fiscal procyclicality, while 
FRs coverage is not a critical issue. Finally, we provide empirical evidences about the positive 
impact of flexible rules adoption, and of the adoption of the most widespread combination of 
FRs worldwide (i.e. the budget balance rule and the debt rule). 
3.3. Results from instrumentation 
A growing literature relative to the macroeconomic impact of FRs focus on the national 
stability culture, which may overestimate the positive effects of explicit constraints on fiscal 
targets (see Heinemann et al., 2014, for a literature review). Indeed, the stability culture is 
fundamentally an unobserved factor which is not well captured by PSM methods and might 
induce an upper omitted unobserved factor bias of FRs impact, since these latter may just 
mirror fiscal preferences of politicians and voters. Having said that, stability culture may be 
approximate by past inflation rates (Heinemann et al., 2014), fiscal preferences of political 
parties (Benoit and Laver, 2006), strength of governments (Heinemann et al., 2014; 
Woldendorp et al., 2000), population trust (Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Heinemann et al., 
2014; Roubini and Sachs, 1989), but also by opinion surveys (Bohn and Inman, 1996; 
Heinemann and Hennighausen, 2012;  Stix, 2013), referendum results (Dafflon and Pujol, 
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2001; Pujol and Weber, 2003), or lexicometry on politicians speeches (Pujol, 2009). Except to 
past inflation rates, proxies of stability culture are available for a limited number of countries, 
namely the United States and Western Europe. Moreover, some proxies of stability culture, 
such as fiscal preferences of parties, population trust, opinion surveys, or referendum results 
are irrelevant to capture stability culture in authoritarian countries. So, in order to take into 
account the potential impact of stability culture on procyclicality in our wide sample of 
countries we are instrumenting FRs adoption by its lag value and an indicator of FRs spread, 
which vary across time: 
;89<=> = ? (.@ ∗B$@C
DEFG
? DEFHIJK
),         (6) 
where .@ indicate if the country L have adopted or not an FR at year M and 
DNOG
? DEFHIJK
 is the 
economic weight of country L at year M. The underlying idea is that FRs are more likely to be 
adopted in country P when more countries decide to adopt FRs, especially if they have a 
strong economic influence worldwide. Theoretically, the exclusion restriction is likely to be 
satisfied, since the adoption of FRs in other countries don't have any impact on national fiscal 
performance. We check our instrumentation strategy by using the 2SLS estimator in a linear 
model, while controlling for indicators previously used for the PSM methods: 
 = Q + R. + 7 +"ST + U + V,        (7) 
where 7 is the vector of controlling variables used for the estimation of propensity scores, ST 
is a continent specific effect and Ua time specific effect.19"V is the stochastic disturbance 
term. We don't use the Difference GMM estimator or the System GMM estimator, since they 
encounter overfit problem with long T panels (Bowsher, 2002; Roodman, 2009). 
Results from linear estimations are displayed in Table 2 (hereafter). Overidentification tests 
doesn't reject the validity of the exclusion condition.20 Furthermore, the damping impact of 
FRs adoption on fiscal procyclicality is systematically higher when we control for the omitted 
unobserved factor bias. Precisely, FRs adoption upgrade fiscal policy responsiveness by 0.151 
percentage points and 0.276 percentage points with OLS estimations, and improve fiscal 
policy responsiveness by 0.164 percentage points and 0.306 percentage points with 2SLS 
                                                           
19
 We don't introduce countries specific effects because the estimated covariance matrix of moment conditions is not of full 
rank, when we instrumenting. 
20
 Note that the instrument of FR spread has a negative and significant impact on FRs adoption when we control for time 
dummies (i.e. common periodic shocks), and has a positive and significant impact on FRs adoption otherwise. These results 
are not surprising since time dummies are necessarily capturing the effect of FR spread on FRs adoption.  
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estimations. Our findings are in line with Heinemann et al. (2014); indeed, FRs must reinforce 
fiscal performance in countries with a historical lack of stability culture. 
So, we find that FRs adoption  reduce procyclical behavior of fiscal policy, by taking into 
account the omitted unobserved factor bias of stability culture with instrumental methods. 
Indeed, the impact of FRs on procyclicality reduction is reinforce when we instrument by lag 
value of FRs adoption and our constructed indicator of  FRs spread. This may imply that FRs 
are effective even in a context of historical weakness of stability culture, which is actually the 
case in a significant number of emerging countries and low income economies. 
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Table 2:  Linear Estimation of FRs Impact 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ols 2sls ols 2sls ols 2sls ols 2sls ols 2sls 
Fiscal Policy Responsiveness 
                  
Fiscal Rules Adoption 0.276*** 0.306*** 0.177** 0.211*** 0.151* 0.181** 0.152** 0.183** 0.136 0.164* 
  [0.0776] [0.0801] [0.0705] [0.0769] [0.0839] [0.0904] [0.0714] [0.0780] [0.0848] [0.0916] 
                  
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies No No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Continent Dummies No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,265 2,239 2,239 2,239 2,239 2,239 2,239 2,239 2,239 2,239 
Adjusted R2 0.038 - 0.187 - 0.183 - 0.208 - 0.204 - 
lag Fiscal Rules Adoption (1st step Estimation)   0.958***   0.919***   0.915***   0.918***   0.914*** 
    [0.006]   [0.008]   [0.009]   [0.008]   [0.009] 
Fiscal Rules Spread (1st step Estimation)   0.164**   0.116*   -6.549**   0.116*   -6.546** 
    [0.073]   [0.069]   [2.774]   [0.068]   [2.758] 
F-test (p-value)   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 
Sargan/Hansen J stat. (p-value)   0.743   0.289   0.235   0.362   0.275 
Note: clustered standard errors in brackets. 
***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%. 
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4. Conclusion 
This article renews the old debate of "rules versus. discretion", by introducing PSM methods 
in macro analysis, such as Tapsoba (2012), and by using instrumental methods. By taking into 
account the self-selection problem and the omitted unobserved factor bias of stability culture 
in a sample of 126 countries of all level of development over the period 1985-2010, we 
provide strong evidence about the positive causal effect of FRs adoption on the reduction of  
fiscal policy procyclicality. 
 We find that FRs adoption contributed  to upgrade budget balance in periods of expansion, 
while it doesn't increase budget deficit in periods of recession. Furthermore, we show that the 
budget balance rules and the debt rules are more effective to dampen procyclicality than 
expenditure rules. We also provide evidence that the coverage of FRs is not a critical issue to 
strength against procyclicality. Empirical results also displays the positive impact of the 
adoption of flexible rules, but also the adoption of  FRs combined to improve policy 
responsiveness. Finally, we find that FRs are effective even in a context of historical 
weakness of stability culture, which is actually the case in a significant number of emerging 
countries and low income economies. This positive impact of FRs adoption on fiscal policy 
cyclicality comes from an  improvement of fiscal policy disciplinary, by ensuring a 
sustainable path of deficit and debt (Tapsoba, 2012; Combes et al., 2014), or by smoothing 
business cycles (Fatás and Mihov, 2006). 
 In terms of policy recommendations, FRs adoption is an effective reform to improving the 
control on fiscal policy. The targeting of FRs is a critical issue for governments when they 
strength against procyclicality, while  the coverage of FRs isn't. However, the simple adoption 
of FRs is clearly not sufficient to guarantee fiscal policy countercyclicality, since they must be 
accompanied by enforcement mechanisms, transparency improvements in fiscal procedures, 
and by independent fiscal institutions, such as fiscal councils. 
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Appendix b. 
Table 1.b.: Sample 
Whole Sample 
FRers Non-FRers 
Antigua and Barbuda (2) Guinea-Bissau (1) St. Lucia (2) Albania Malaysia 
Argentina (2) Hong Kong SAR. China (3) St. Vincent and the Grenadines (2) Algeria Mauritania 
Australia (3) Hungary (2) Sweden (3) Bahamas. The Mongolia 
Austria (3) Iceland (3) Switzerland (3) Bahrain Morocco 
Belgium (3) India (2) Togo (1) Bangladesh Mozambique 
Benin (1) Indonesia (2) United Kingdom (3) Barbados Nepal 
Botswana (2) Israel (3) United States (3) Belize Nicaragua 
Brazil (2) Italy (3)   Bhutan Oman 
Bulgaria (2) Japan (3)   Bolivia Paraguay 
Burkina Faso (1) Kenya (1)   Brunei Darussalam Philippines 
Cameroon (1) Latvia (2)   Burundi Rwanda 
Canada (3) Luxembourg (3)   China Saudi Arabia 
Cape Verde (1) Mali (1)   Comoros Sierra Leone 
Central African Republic (1) Malta (2)   Dominican Republic Singapore 
Chad (1) Mauritius (2)   Egypt. Arab Rep. South Africa 
Chile (2) Mexico (2)   El Salvador Sudan 
Colombia (2) Namibia (2)   Ethiopia Suriname 
Congo. Rep. (1) Netherlands (3)   Fiji Swaziland 
Costa Rica (2) New Zealand (3)   Gambia. The Thailand 
Cote d'Ivoire (1) Niger (1)   Georgia Tonga 
Cyprus (3) Nigeria (1)   Ghana Trinidad and Tobago 
Denmark (3) Norway (3)   Guatemala Tunisia 
Dominica (1) Pakistan (2)   Guyana Turkey 
Ecuador (2) Panama (2)   Honduras Uganda 
Finland (3) Peru (2)   Jordan Uruguay 
France (3) Portugal (3)   Korea. Rep. Vanuatu 
Gabon (1) Senegal (1)   Lesotho Venezuela. RB 
Germany (3) Spain (3)   Liberia Zambia 
Greece (3) Sri Lanka (2)   Madagascar Zimbabwe 
Grenada (1) St. Kitts and Nevis (2)   Malawi   
Note: Income categories of FRers countries, in parenthesis,  refers to Budina et al. (2012). (1): Low Income Countries ; (2): Emerging Countries ; (3): Advanced 
Countries. 
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Table 2.b.: FRs adopting date 
Adopting Date 
  Sustainability rules Medium-lasting rules   Sustainability rules Medium-lasting rules 
Countries BBR DR ER RR Countries BBR DR ER RR 
Antigua and Barbuda (Sup.) 1998 (R) 1998     India (G) 2004 (R)       
Argentina (EC) 2000 (R)   2000 (R) Indonesia 1985 (2004) 2004     
Australia 1985 (1998) 1998 1985 1985 Israel (G) 1992 (2010*)   2005 (2010*)   
Austria (Sup. ; CA ; EC) 1995 (1998) 1995 Italy (Sup. ; EC) 1992 1992     
Belgium (Sup. ; EC) 1992 1992 1993 (1998) 1995 (1999) Japan (G) 1947 (1998) 2006* (2010*)     
Benin (Sup. ; G ; EC) 2000 2000 Kenya   1997   1997 
Botswana     2003 Latvia (Sup. ; EC) 2004 2004     
Brazil (G ; EC)   2000 2000 Luxembourg (Sup. ; G ; EC)   1990 (2004*) 1990   
Bulgaria (Sup. ; G) 2006 2003 2006 (2010*) Mali (Sup. ; G ; EC) 2000 2000     
Burkina Faso (Sup. ; G ; EC) 2000 2000 Malta (Sup. ; EC) 2004 2004     
Cameroon (Sup. ; G) 2002 (2008*) 2002 Mauritius   2008*     
Canada 1998 (2006) 1998 (2006) 1998 (2006) Mexico (EC) 2006 (2009*)       
Cape Verde 2002 2002 Namibia   2001     
Central African Republic (Sup. ; G) 2002 (2008*) 2002 Netherlands (Sup. ; G ; EC) 1992 1992 1994 1994 
Chad (Sup. ; G) 2002 (2008*) 2002 New Zealand (G) 1994 1994     
Chile (CA) 2001 (2010*)   Niger (Sup ; G ; EC) 2000 2000     
Colombia 2011*   2000 Nigeria 2007*       
Congo. Rep. (Sup. ; G) 2002 (2008*) 2002 Norway (CA) 2001       
Costa Rica (G) 2001   Pakistan (G ; EC) 2005 2005     
Cote d'Ivoire (Sup. ; G ; EC) 2000 2000 Panama (CA ; EC) 2002* (2008*) 2002* (2008*)     
Cyprus (Sup. ; EC) 2004 2004 Peru (EC) 2000 (2003)   2000 (2003)   
Denmark (Sup. ; CA ; G ; EC)  1992 (2011*) 1992 1994 (2009*) 2001 (2012*) Portugal (Sup. ; EC) 1992 1992     
Dominica (Sup.) 1998 (2006) 1998 Senegal (Sup. ; G ; EC) 2000 2000     
Ecuador (G) 2003 (2010*) 2003 (2010*) Spain (Sup. ; CA ; G ; EC)  1992 (2006) 1992 2011*   
Finland (Sup. ; CA ; G ; EC)  1995 (2011*) 1995 (2011*) 2003 (2011*) Sri Lanka 2003 2003     
France (Sup. ; EC) 1992 1992 1998 (2011*) 2006 (2011*) St. Kitts and Nevis (Sup.) 1998 (R) 1998     
Gabon (Sup. ; G) 2002 (2008*) 2002 St. Lucia (Sup.) 1998 (R) 1998     
Germany (Sup. ; CA ; G ; EC)  1985 (2009*) 1992 1985 (2008*) St. Vincent and the Grenadines (Sup.) 1998 (R) 1998     
Greece (Sup. ; EC) 1992 1992 Sweden (Sup ; CA ; EC) 1995 (2000) 1995 1997   
Grenada (Sup.) 2000 (2006) 2000 Switzerland (CA ; EC)         
Guinea-Bissau (Supr. ; G ; EC) 2000 2000 Togo (Sup. ; G ; EC) 2000 2000     
Hong Kong SAR. China (G) 1997   United Kingdom 1992 (2010*) 1992 (2010*)     
Hungary (Sup. ; EC) 2004 (2012*) 2004 (2012*) 2010* United States (G) 1986*   1990 (2011*)   
Iceland     2004 (R)             
Note: Information on FRs adoption come from the Fiscal Rules Dataset (1985-2012). BBR: budget balance rule. DR: debt rule. ER: expenditure rule. RR: revenue rule. * means that we don't take into account the adoption date 
because the considered FR is implemented for less than 5 years in our sample (1985-2010).  Sup. signals that country adopted a supranational FR. CA signals the presence of FRs targeting cyclically-adjusted balance or structural 
balance. G signals the presence of a "golden rules". EC signals that FRs has a well-defined escape clause. Year of last major change in FR implementation appears in parenthesis, while R stand for countries that repealed the rule 
during the time horizon. 
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Appendix c. 
Table 1.c.: Estimating Propensity Scores (Full Sample) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
    Basic Rules Flexible Rules Coverage of Rules   
VARIABLES FR 
Budget 
Balance 
Rule 
Debt Rule Expenditure Rule 
Cyclically-
Adjusted 
Balance 
Rule 
Golden Rule Escape Clause 
National  
Rule 
Supranational 
Rule 
Sustainability 
rules 
                      
Lag discretionary fiscal policy -0.242*** -0.256*** -0.272*** -0.297*** -0.439*** -0.351*** -0.280*** -0.226*** -0.269*** -0.295*** 
[0.0311] [0.0331] [0.0346] [0.0611] [0.0815] [0.0409] [0.0471] [0.0410] [0.0434] [0.0366] 
Log GDP per cap. 0.212*** 0.234*** 0.0902*** 0.436*** 0.918*** 0.171*** 0.00806 0.232*** 0.173*** 0.124*** 
[0.0251] [0.0265] [0.0244] [0.0445] [0.124] [0.0293] [0.0318] [0.0320] [0.0297] [0.0252] 
Log consumption expenditure ratio (%GDP) 0.0505 -0.297*** 0.466*** 1.013*** -0.262 -0.121 -0.0615 0.0817 0.0661 0.192* 
[0.0931] [0.102] [0.0997] [0.162] [0.257] [0.105] [0.122] [0.115] [0.122] [0.102] 
Log natural rents ratio (%GDP) 0.123*** 0.149*** 0.179*** 0.410*** 0.444*** 0.184*** 0.189*** 0.0789* 0.116*** 0.220*** 
[0.0343] [0.0365] [0.0380] [0.0613] [0.0938] [0.0416] [0.0478] [0.0403] [0.0425] [0.0413] 
Democracy degree 0.638*** 0.820*** 0.898*** 1.737*** 3.563*** 0.247 0.968*** 0.482*** 0.912*** 1.060*** 
[0.147] [0.150] [0.151] [0.235] [0.487] [0.175] [0.191] [0.181] [0.163] [0.154] 
Federal -0.254*** -0.314*** -0.228** 0.00775 -0.347** -0.0983 0.260** -0.0589 -0.809*** -0.361*** 
[0.0915] [0.101] [0.104] [0.136] [0.158] [0.117] [0.129] [0.111] [0.134] [0.113] 
Presidential 0.348*** -0.0108 0.185 0.997*** 0.0414 0.0440 -0.0249 0.648*** -0.980*** -0.159 
[0.0957] [0.103] [0.116] [0.159] [0.208] [0.114] [0.125] [0.111] [0.161] [0.124] 
Majoritary 0.0571 -0.205*** 0.210** -0.183 -0.731*** -0.0384 -0.654*** 0.0465 -0.128 0.0199 
[0.0754] [0.0789] [0.0855] [0.142] [0.177] [0.0917] [0.121] [0.103] [0.100] [0.0860] 
Member of Currency Union 1.446*** 1.491*** 1.749*** 0.873*** 1.019*** 1.444*** 1.682*** -0.511*** 2.197*** 1.770*** 
[0.0773] [0.0791] [0.0822] [0.136] [0.165] [0.0874] [0.107] [0.179] [0.0928] [0.0842] 
              
Pseudo-R2 0.277 0.302 0.361 0.423 0.591 0.241 0.332 0.183 0.506 0.385 
Observations 2,239 2,131 2,069 1,655 1,619 1,825 1,705 1,750 1,954 2,000 
Note : robust standard errors in brackets. Unreported constant included. 
***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%. 
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Appendix d. 
Table 1.d.: Descsriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FR 2365 0.329 0.470 0 1 
BBR 2365 0.284 0.451 0 1 
DR 2365 0.257 0.437 0 1 
ER 2365 0.082 0.275 0 1 
CA 2365 0.065 0.246 0 1 
G 2365 0.154 0.361 0 1 
Sup. 2365 0.209 0.407 0 1 
Sustainability Rules (BBR+DR) 2365 0.228 0.420 0 1 
FR Spread 2365 0.025 0.063 0 0.292 
Budget Balance Responsiveness 2365 0.347 0.662 -2.067 4.161 
Budget Balance Ratio (% GDP) 2365 -2.166 5.196 -33.112 40.339 
Primary Budget Balance Ratio (% GDP) 1485 0.303 4.536 -19.289 31.794 
Output Gap 2365 0.001 0.0447 -0.538 0.692 
Discretionary Fiscal Policy 2365 2.579 1.205 -1.902 9.506 
Macroeconomic Volatility 2365 0.525 0.936 -2.981 4.421 
Real GDP pc 2365 11156.35 14828.69 111.886 87716.73 
Consumption Expenditure Ratio (% GDP) 2365 16.191 6.697 1.281 97.154 
Natural Rents Ratio (% GDP) 2365 6.779 11.962 0 78.593 
Democracy Degree 2365 0.660 0.325 0 1 
Federalism 2365 0.192 0.394 0 1 
Presidentialism 2365 0.233 0.423 0 1 
Majoritarian 2365 0.341 0.474 0 1 
Member C.U 2365 0.273 0.445 0 1 
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Table 2.d.: Variables and Definitions 
 Variable Definition Source 
Discretionary Fiscal Policy 
Fatas and Mihov's  measure of discretionary fiscal policy: we use annual data over 1984-2011 to estimate the 
following equation for each country: 
G_(i,t)= _i+_i Y_(i,t)+ _i G_(i,t-1)+_i W_(i,t)+_(i,t), 
where G_(i,t) is the logarithm of real government spending, Y_(i,t) is the logarithm of real GDP and  W_(i,t) is a 
vector of control variables,  including  inflation rate, inflation squared and a time trend. The standard deviation of  
_(i,t)  is interpreted as the size of a discretionary change in fiscal policy for country i. Because output may be 
endogenous,  we use two stage least-square method, and we instrument output by two lags of GDP growth, the 
index of oil prices and lagged inflation. 
Author's construction 
 
    
Fiscal Policy Responsiveness Aghion and Marinescu's measure of fiscal policy responsiveness. 
    
 
FRs dummies Binary variable equaling 1 if country have the specified FR in place for more than 4 years, 0 otherwise. Fiscal Rule Dataset by the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department (2012) 
   
FR spread Indicator of  the number of FRs adopted in foreign countries at time t, weighted by their economical weight 
worldwide, at time t.  Author's Construction 
    
 Log budget balance ratio Net lending (+)/ borrowing (–) is calculated as revenue minus total expenditure %GDP. 
World Economic Outlook (WEO, 2013) 
 
    
Log primary budget balance ratio Net lending (+)/ borrowing (–) is calculated as revenue minus total expenditure (excluding interest payments) %GDP. 
    
 
Log real GDP per capita GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$). World Development Indicators (WDI, 2014); Penn World Table (PWT 8.0) 
    
 Output Gap Output gap is calculated as the difference between log of GDP and log of GDP trend (HP filter). 
Author's construction     
 Macroeconomic Volatility Standard deviation of GDP growth rate. 
    
 
Log consumption expenditure ratio Consumption expenditure % GDP. World Development Indicators (WDI, 2014); Penn World Table (PWT 8.0) 
    
 Log natural rents Natural resource exportation %GDP. World Development Indicators (WDI, 2014) 
    
 Democracy degree Linear interpolation of freedom house political right index and polity2 index Freedom House (2014); PolityIV (2011) 
    
 
Federalism Binary variable equaling 1 if country have a federal state form, 0 otherwise. Perspective Monde (2014); CIA WorldFactbook (2014) 
    
 
Presidentialism Binary variable equaling 1 if country have a presidential form of government, 0 otherwise. Cheibub et al. (2009); Perspective Monde (2014) 
    
 
Majoritarian Binary variable equaling 1 if country have a majoritarian electoral system in place, 0 otherwise. Bormann and Golder (2013); Perspective Monde (2014) 
    
 
Member of currency union Binary variable equaling 1 if country is member of a currency union, 0 otherwise. Fiscal Rule Database by the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department (2012) 
      
